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The New Member States (NMS) have to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
rules: public deficits below 3% of GDP and public debts below 60% of GDP, although they 
cannot be subject to fines as long as they are not members of the euro area. Most of the NMS 
currently run higher than 3% of GDP deficits but lower than 60% of GDP debts. The 
implementation of the surveillance procedures had led 6 of the 12 NMS to be under an 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) soon after they joined the EU.  
Are the SGP rules adequate for the NMS? The SGP rules were not designed for catching-up 
countries, but for ‘old member States’. In particular, the initial rules of the SGP did not 
account for investment needs. A Golden rule for public finances would be especially 
appropriate for the NMS, since it would allow them to borrow to finance investment needs 
that will benefit not only current but also future generations. We argue that SGP rules are not 
adapted for the NMS and that better rules should be introduced in the prospect of euro area 
enlargement. 
Section 1 provides a brief assessment of the current situation of public finance criteria in the 
NMS. Section 2 considers the rationale of SGP framework for the NMS. Section 3 advocates 
for a better fiscal rule: the golden rule. Section 4 concludes.  
1. The current macroeconomic context 
1.1. The NMS and SGP requirements: 3% of GDP deficits and 60% of GDP public debts  
6 of the 12 NMS that joined the EU in May 2004 had to face an EDP as soon as from July 
2004: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia and Poland. The EDP was 
initiated because of higher than 3% of GDP deficits. 
Contrary to euro area countries currently under an EDP, the NMS currently running higher 
than 3% of GDP deficits also run low debts (see Table 1). Since several member states were 
allowed to join the euro area despite higher than 60% of GDP debt levels (Belgium, Greece, 
Italy), the debt criteria has in practice been ‘forgotten’, although it is the relevant criteria in 
terms of default risk in a monetary union (but 60% is certainly not the adequate level). 
Hence, some EU-15 countries (like Belgium) do not face any EDP since they run low deficits 
together with well above 60% of GDP public debts, while NMS are de facto in the worst 
position as concerns the implementation of Maastricht fiscal criteria: they are accused of 
running excessive deficits and requested to bring them below 3% of GDP, although theyndo 
not raise any default risk in terms of public debt. This illustrates once again the lack of 
rationale of the SGP fiscal rules. 
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Public debts are below 60% of GDP in most NMS, at the exception of Cyprus (70%) and 
Malta (77%) (see Table 2). In the NMS-8, public debts are well below 60% of GDP and have 
been rising in recent years only in the Czech Republic (from 13 to 36%), in Poland (40 to 
46%) and in Slovenia (25 to 29%). It is important to recognise that these countries have huge 
investment needs related with their catching-up process (like is shown in Antczak et al., 
2006).  
Table 1. Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, 2005 
In 2005 
Government 
balance,  
% of GDP 
Government debt, 
% GDP 
Inflation, 
% 
Current account, 
% of GDP 
Germany -3.9 68.6 2.0 3.8 
France -3.2 66.5 2.0 -0.8 
Italy -4.3 108.6 2.2 -1.2 
Portugal -6.0 65.9 2.2 -9.5 
Greece -3.7 107.9 3.5 -7.4 
United Kingdom -3.4 43.1 2.4 -2.1 
Poland -3.6 46.3 2.2 -3.2 
Czech Republic -3.2 36.2 1.7 -2.9 
Hungary -6.1 57.2 3.7 -8.4 
Slovakia -4.1 36.7 2.9 -6.6 
Malta -4.2 77.2 3.7 -9.9 
Cyprus -2.8 70.4 2.3 -5.8 
EU-15 -2.7 65.1 2.3 -0.1 
EU-25 -2.7 64.1 2.3 -0.3/-0.4 
Source: European Commission, Autumn 2005 forecasts 
Table 2. NMS: government variables and current account balances 
% of GDP 
 
General 
Government 
balance,  
2005 
Gen. govt 
debt,  
1999/2005 
Gen. govt 
gross 
investment 
1995(1) /2004 
Gen. govt 
expenditure, 
1995(1)/2005
 
Current 
account 
balance, 
2004  
Net FDI 
2004 
Share in 
Eu-25 
GDP, 
2004  
Czech R. -3.2 13.4/36.2 5.1/5.0 54.4/45.0 -5.2 3.6 0.83 
Estonia 1.1 6.1/5.1 5.0/3.0 43.8/39.6 -12.7 6.9 0.09 
Cyprus -2.8 59.9/70.4 2.9/4.1 37.3/44.1 -6.0 3.0 0.12 
Latvia -1.2 12.6/12.8 1.9/1.5 39.3/36.4 -12.8 4.3 0.11 
Lithuania -2.0 23.0/20.7 3.4/3.5 36.1/34.8 -7.7 2.3 0.17 
Hungary -6.1 61.2/57.2 2.9/3.6 49.9/49.5 -8.8 3.5 0.78 
Malta -4.2 57.2/77.2 4.9/4.4 43.6/50.7 -10.3 8.0 0.04 
Poland -3.6 40.3/46.3 3.4/3.5 51.3/45.0 -4.1 4.7 1.88 
Slovenia -1.7 24.9/29.3  3.2/3.4 48.9/47.2 -2.1 0.9 0.25 
Slovakia -4.1 47.2/36.7 2.3/2.5 54.1/41.2 -0.9 (2) 1.6 (2) 0.32 
EU-15 -2.7 67.8/65.1 2.6/2.4 51.1/48.1   95.4 
EU-25 -2.7 66.7/64.1  2.3/2.5 45.6/47.9   100.0 
Notes: (1) In italics: Cyprus: 1998, Hungary, Malta: 1999, Slovenia, EU-25: 2000; (2) in 2003. 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2005 forecasts, IMF. 
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1.2. The NMS and negative spillovers 
The NMS do not currently raise any risk in terms of negative externalities for their European 
partners in the prospect of euro area membership. In a monetary union, the negative spillovers 
to be feared are: inflation, current account deficits and public debt default risk.  
In EMU a country running excessive inflation would at some point cause a rise in the central 
bank’s interest rate. Table 3 shows that inflationary pressures are not an issue for most of the 
NMS: inflation is close to the nominal inflation criteria, except for Latvia (6.9%), Estonia 
(4.1) and to a lesser extent Hungary (3.5). At the end of 2005, CPI inflation was amongst the 
lowest in the EU-25 in the Czech Republic and Poland. In the catching-up process, more rapid 
inflation in the NMS than in the OMS would be expected through the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. 
Table 3. NMS and the convergence criteria 
In 2005 
Government 
balance, 
%GDP (1) 
Government 
debt, % 
GDP (1) 
Inflation,
% (1) 
Inflation, 
Dec. 05/ 
Dec. 04  
Short-term 
interest rates 
Long-term 
interest rates 
Czech Republic – 3.2/-3.7 36.2/36.6 1.7/2.9 1.6 1.9 3.5 
Estonia 1.1/0.6 5.1/4.0 4.1/3.3 4.1 2.4 4.0 
Cyprus -2.8/-2.8 70.4/69.1 2.3/2.1 2.0 4.4 5.2 
Latvia -1.2/-1.5 12.8/13.0 6.8/6.0 6.9 3.1 3.9 
Lithuania -2.0/-1.8 20.7/20.2 2.6/2.8 2.7 2.4 3.7 
Hungary -6.1/-6.7 57.2/58.0 3.7/3.0 3.5 7.0 6.4 
Malta – 4.2/-3.0 77.2/77.4 3.1/2.6 2.5 3.2 4.6 
Poland – 3.6/-3.6 46.3/47.0 2.2/2.3 2.2 5.2 5.2 
Slovenia – 1.7/-1.9 29.3/29.5 2.6/2.5 2.5 4.1 3.8 
Slovakia – 4.1/-3.0 36.7/38.2 2.9/3.6 2.8 2.9 3.5 
EU-15 – 2.7/-2.7 65.1/65.2 2.3/2.2 2.1 2.6 3.6 
EU-25 – 2.7-2.7 64.1/64.2 2.3/2.2 2.2 -  
Criteria <3.0 <60  <2.5 (2)  <5.3(3) 
(1) Resp. estimate for 2005 and forecast for 2006, European Commission 
(2) Average inflation in the 3 less inflationary countries over the last 12 months: 1.0 (0.8 in Finland and Sweden, 1.5 in the 
Netherlands) + 1.5.  
(3) Average 10 year benchmark interest rate in 2005 in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands: 3.3 + 2.0 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2005 forecasts, Eurostat. 
 
In EMU, current account deficits are a potential threat to exchange rate stability, but this 
externality is not currently taken into account in the European surveillance framework. Hence 
Spain runs a higher that 7% of GDP current account deficit while Germany runs a 4% of GDP 
surplus. In the past, the Spanish peseta would have been under pressure to depreciate, but now 
this constraint has disappeared. As long Spain runs a 0% of GDP government deficit, it is 
considered to be the good ‘pupil’ of the euro area, while Germany is blamed for running 
higher than 3% of GDP government deficits.  
The NMS currently under an EDP run significant current account deficits. It is however 
normal for catching-up countries to strongly invest and to finance a part of their investment 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Taking into account net foreign direct 
investment, it can be seen that most of the NMS do not have any major current account 
deficits, as net FDIs are substantial (see Table 2). The three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) run low government deficits and debts, but large current account deficits. This is 
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true also when net FDIs are taken into consideration. In the case of Latvia, the external 
account was in surplus in the early 1990’s (12.7% in 1991) and deteriorated continuously 
since then. Current accounts show smaller deficits in the other NMS. Among the larger NMS, 
Hungary’s situation is more fragile than Poland, where the current deficit is as high as net 
FDIs, Czech Republic is in an intermediate situation. 
2. The rationale of the SGP framework for the NMS 
2.1. The rationale behind the original rules 
The SGP rules have been implemented in the context of ‘old member states’ joining a 
monetary union. The justification for the 3% of GDP rule remains unclear. Among the 
reasons often given, the 3% of GDP level would be the level that would stabilise debt to GDP 
ratios at 60%, for a country with a nominal growth of 5% a year.  
Nominal growth is in fact well above 5% in most of the NMS (the exception being Malta). 
Considering averages for 2001-2007, as estimated in the latest European Commission 
Forecasts, nominal growth ranges from 5.7 in Poland to 13.0 in Latvia (see table 4). Let us 
consider the Czech Republic: the current government debt stands at 36% of GDP and with a 
nominal growth of 6.6%, a deficit of 2.4 % of GDP will stabilise the debt to GDP ratio at its 
current level. A deficit of 4% would be consistent with a stable debt ratio of 60% of GDP.  
Only Hungary and Poland had a public deficit slightly above the level required to stabilize 
their debt at 60% of GDP in 2005.  
Table 4 
 
Public 
balance, 
%GDP, 
2005 
Public 
debt, % 
GDP, 
2005  
Real GDP 
growth, %
2001-2007 
GDP 
deflator, % 
2001-2007 
Nominal 
GDP 
growth, %
2001-2007 
Deficit 
stabilising 
the debt ratio 
At current 
level 
Deficit 
stabilising 
the debt ratio 
At 60% 
Czech R. -3.2 36.2 3.6 2.9 6.6 2.39 3.96 
Estonia 1.1 5.1 7.3 3.7 11.3 0.58 6.78 
Cyprus -2.8 70.4 3.4 2.9 6.4 4.51 3.84 
Latvia -1.2 12.8 7.7 5.1 13.2 1.69 7.92 
Lithuania -2.0 20.7 7.2 1.7 9.0 1.86 5.40 
Hungary -6.1 57.2 3.7 5.6 9.5 5.43 5.70 
Malta -4.2 77.2 0.3 2.6 2.9 2.24 1.74 
Poland -3.6 46.3 3.4 2.2 5.7 2.64 3.42 
Slovenia -1.7 29.3 3.6 4.6 8.4 2.46 5.04 
Slovakia -4.1 36.7 5.0 3.7 8.9 3.27 5.34 
Source: European Commission. own calculations 
 
Another justification given for the 3% of GDP limit would be that it was the average level of 
public investment as a percentage of GDP in the OMS. But if this was applied to the NMS, 
then the limit for deficits would be closer to 5 than to 3%: so a higher limit would be more 
appropriate for the NMS 
For those in favour of applying the Maastricht rules to the deficits, the justification is in fact 
of another kind: the deficit ceiling is seen as a tool enabling to lower the level of public 
spending in the NMS. It is a way to cut public consumption and social transfers deemed to be 
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inefficient and even to have a negative impact on growth. Public spending is considered to 
have anti-Keynesian effects. The argument is more in terms of reducing the size of the State 
in the economy. Governments run too high public spending for ‘electoral’ reasons, but this 
leads agents to anticipate future higher taxation and hence to lower their consumption and 
investment. So the implementation of the SGP is a way to reduce the level of public spending 
and would support growth in the medium-term. These anti-Keynesian views have become 
widespread in Europe, both among the academics, at the European Commission and at the 
ECB.  
But what about the macroeconomic management in the US, where fiscal policy is still used in 
a Keynesian way and has in the economic slowdown initiated in 2000 played a strong part in 
boosting US GDP. Why would the situation be different in Europe?  
The choice of the level of public expenditure must be left to the People of each country. The 
Commission has not right to interfere with this choice. The NMS currently have a level of 
public expenditure close to the level of the OMS (see Table 2). The European authorities 
should not encourage the NMS to move towards a liberal model (less public expenditure, 
privatisation of pension and of health insurance) which is not the model of the majority of 
OMS.  
2.2. The NMS and the 2005 reform of the SGP1  
The SGP rules have undergone a reform in March 2005, when the Commission and all 
Member States agreed on a text adopted by the Ecofin Council. The agreement accounted for 
the ‘increased divergence in an enlarged Union’.  
The SGP remains essential in the EMU macroeconomic framework, without the reasons why 
the Pact did not work being commented. The Council states that the economic rationale of 
budgetary rules must be enhanced but also that the 3% of GDP value for the deficit ratio and 
the 60% value for the debt ratio remain the centrepiece of multilateral surveillance.  
Part II of the agreement, ‘Strengthening the preventive arm’, accepts to define medium 
term objectives (MTO) differentiated for each Member State. But the range goes only from -
1% of GDP for low debt/high potential growth countries to balance or surplus for high 
debt/low potential growth countries. These limits have no economic rationale. 
Hence NMS are required to have a MTO of -1% of GDP, which means for a country with 
nominal GDP growing by an annual 7%, to have a public debt of 14% of GDP, which is a 
very low level. Why not consider a deficit stabilising public debt at a reasonable level (i.e. an 
objective for the structural deficit of around 3.5% for a country with a nominal growth of 
7%)?  
The implicit liabilities from ageing populations will be taken into account. But why not 
consider the social contributions that people could pay to have a satisfying level of pension 
and health insurance? Countries with generous public pensions systems may well have a 
higher tax burden than countries where employees need to save on an individual basis in view 
of retirement or health spending.  
Member States having not reached their MTO should make a budgetary effort of 0.5% of 
GDP per year (in cyclically adjusted and excluding one-off measures balances). The effort 
should be higher in positive output gap periods, smaller in bad times. But potential output and 
the economic cycle are difficult to assess.  
                                                          
1 This part is to a large extent based on Fritsche and al. (2005). 
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Structural reforms, in particular pension reforms introducing a mandatory, fully funded pillar, 
will be taken into account if they raise potential growth and induce long-term savings in the 
long run. The design of the Social Security system is a national choice and there is no 
justification for a European rule to provide incentives for a fully funded system. 
Part III is entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’. The 
Commission will prepare a report if the deficit exceeds 3%. A small and temporary breaching 
of the rule will be allowed if it is due to negative growth or a strong negative output gap. The 
Commission report will take account of a number of factors such as: policies implemented in 
the framework of the Lisbon agenda, R&D spending, public investments, economic situation 
or debt sustainability. Member States will be able to put forward other factors like budgetary 
efforts for international solidarity, European goals or European unification. The cost of the 
introduction of a compulsory, fully funded pension pillar would also be taken into account. 
These elements may prevent to launch an EDP if the breaching of the deficit is limited and 
temporary. They could also allow for longer adjustment paths to bringing deficits below 3%.  
On the one hand, the Commission keeps the right to prepare a report for each country 
breaching the ceiling and will be entitled to send directly an early warning. On the other hand, 
the state concerned will be entitled to justify its fiscal policy by output gaps, public 
investment, contribution to the EU budget or defence spending, or by the cost of Unification 
(for Germany) or other reasons... So the implementation of the EDP will not be automatic. It 
will require a specific judgement on the economic context and policy choices of the state 
concerned. How can peer countries condemn the policy run by an elected government, if this 
policy does not generate negative externalities for them? 
The reform still lacks economic rationale: there is no reflection on the objective of fiscal 
policy. The medium term objective is not appropriate for the NMS. The 1% MTO for public 
deficits, the 60% threshold, the 0.5% of GDP requested budgetary efforts and more restrictive 
fiscal policies in good times mean that NMS governments will have to justify in permanence 
domestic fiscal developments before the Commission and peer countries.  
3. The golden rule 
Public investment, which will be used over several years, should be financed over a similar 
period of time. Independently of short-term stabilisation consideration, government budgets 
should be split into a current budget - including public capital stock depreciation related 
spending - which should be in balance and an investment budget, which would be financed 
through borrowing. Several economists (Modigliani et al., 1998, Creel et al., 2002, among 
others) have proposed to import this rule in the euro area: the structural current government 
balance, i.e. excluding public investment, should be permanently in balance or in surplus. 
According to the golden rule, borrowing may finance public investment, which is important in 
particular for countries having significant investment needs. Buiter and Grafe (2003) highlight 
precisely the case of the new members of the EU. Under this rule, countries will not have to 
cut public investment to improve government borrowing. Lowering public investment is 
harmful in terms of potential output growth if endogenous growth theory has some relevance.  
Balassone and Franco (2001) reject this rule in the name of the difficulties of measure. The 
rule implies that statisticians are able to estimate the cyclical part of government borrowing 
(therefore the output gap and its impact on public finances), public investment and public 
capital stock depreciation, in other words four questionable measures. But is not it better to 
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use a fair rule, estimated with a low degree of precision than to follow a wrong rule, estimated 
with precision? 
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines the neutrality of fiscal policy, cyclical 
neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public 
savings equals public investment). But a government may choose not to be neutral. It may 
wish to implement an expansionary fiscal policy in times of subdued activity or may wish to 
run a restrictive policy in a period a high inflation. It may wish to implement structural 
measures if it thinks that saving is too high ex ante (which would necessitate a too low interest 
rate) or too low (in the light of demographic changes). The proposed rule confuses a criterion 
of neutrality with a norm for economic policy. As with the existing rule, there is no certainty 
that the fiscal policy needed to reach a satisfying level of activity in a country not controlling 
the interest rate will match the golden rule. 
Should a better than the current rule be proposed? Fiscal rules based on government balance 
will never account for the fact that public finances are only tools to support activity or to 
regulate the savings/investment equilibrium. Any proposal for a European fiscal rule, under 
the control of the Commission, neglects the fact that the surveillance of public finances in 
EMU should aim at avoiding that a country generates negative spill-over effects in partner 
countries rather than trying to define optimal national fiscal policies at the European level. 
4. Designing an appropriate policy-mix for stability and growth 
The monetary and fiscal framework needs to be redesigned in an enlarging euro area, 
accounting for the fact that there is a single monetary policy and national fiscal policies with 
increased heterogeneity among the Member States. In particular, the NMS will be growing 
more rapidly and with more rapid inflation than the OMS. The impact of the NMS will be 
limited at the EU level, due to the fact that they represent less than 5% of EU-25 GDP. But it 
is of first importance that fiscal rules are appropriately designed for catching-up countries, 
especially in terms of public investment. A more economically funded fiscal policy 
coordination has the advantage not to oblige NMS to undertake restrictive fiscal policies  
before entering the euro area. 
Given the current level of European political integration, governments should keep their 
prerogative on national fiscal policy. The surveillance of economic policies should consist in 
avoiding that any national fiscal policy negatively affects the rest of the area (see Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak, 2004). That is why binding rules should bear directly on externalities. Thus, the 
rule should be that countries are allowed to implement the fiscal policy of their choice, as long 
as it does not affect the macroeconomic equilibrium of the area, in other words as long as 
domestic inflation stays in line with the inflation target of the area. For instance, with an 
inflation target set between 1.5% and 3.5% in the area, ‘Northern’ countries’ could have a 
target within 1 and 3%, while catching-up countries would have a target between 2 and 5 %. 
With such rules, a country hit by a negative demand shock would be able to counterbalance it 
through an expansionary policy. Conversely, a country hit by a supply shock (inflationary 
pressures) would have to implement restrictive measures. 
The European authorities – the Commission and the Ecofin Council of the euro area – would 
have the responsibility to check that inflation remains at the level set in each country, and 
possibly to accept some deviations and adjustment periods, in the event of specific or 
common shocks. The European authorities could also have the responsibility to check that 
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domestic public debts do not put public finance sustainability at risk, or that no country runs 
an excessively large current account deficit (net of FDI) relatively to the area current account 
balance. It is crucial that surveillance bears only on issues potentially generating negative 
externalities between countries in the monetary union. 
So, fiscal policy in the euro area should be based on three pillars. Each country could take the 
golden rule for public finances as a Medium Term Objective. A surveillance funded on true 
negative externalities would oblige the Council and the Commission to link fiscal policies and 
macroeconomic unbalances, which is not currently the case. In addition, it would be desirable 
to set up real economic policy coordination in the framework of the Eurogroup, with whom 
the ECB would dialogue. This co-ordination should not focus on public finance balances, but 
should aim at supporting economic activity and achieving the 3% annual growth target of the 
Lisbon strategy. 
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